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ABSTRACT
This research focuses on how susceptible the aviation
system is to a disruption of service. While previous stud-
ies of airline service quality have examined flight delays
and cancellations under normal operating conditions, this
work is the first to examine service quality during irregu-
lar operations. Since the September 11th terrorist attacks,
repeated airport closures due to security concerns have
imposed substantial costs on travelers, airlines, and gov-
ernmental agencies as flights are delayed and canceled.
Using data on security-related airport closures since Sep-
tember 11th, this study examines how airlines recover
flight schedules once an airport reopens. Given that future
security breaches are likely to occur, understanding the
factors that determine schedule recovery are potentially
important. “Last week I announced a crackdown by spe-
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cial agents of the FAA and DOT’s Inspector General fo-
cused on lapses in the security system currently operated
by the airlines. Since then we have stopped flights; closed,
searched and reopened concourses at nine major airports;
and emptied airplanes to re-screen all passengers when we
found that the airlines’ security screeners had not fol-
lowed proper procedures.” (U.S. Transportation Secretary
Norman Mineta, November 5, 2001.)
Keywords: flight delays;  security-related airport;  recover
flight schedules.
RESUMO
Esta pesquisa examina como o sistema da aviação é sus-
cetível à interrupção de serviços. Quando estudos prece-
dentes a respeito da qualidade de serviços de linhas aéreas
examinarem  vôos atrasados e  cancelamentos sob cir-
cunstâncias operacionais  normais, este trabalho será um
dos primeiros a examinar a qualidade do serviço durante
opera-ções irregulares. Desde os ataques terroristas de 11
de setembro, repetidos fechamentos  de aeroportos devi-
do aos interesses da segurança impuseram custos subs-
tanciais aos viajantes, a linhas aéreas e a agências gover-
namentais, durante atrasos  e/ou  can-celamentos. Usando
dados de fechamentos relacionados à segurança de aero-
portos desde 11 de setembro, este estudo examina como
as linhas aéreas recuperam programações de vôos  quan-
do algum aeroporto reabre. Sabendo-se que as rupturas
futuras por segurança são ocorrências prováveis, convém
compreender os fatores que determinam a recuperação
da programação potencial. “Na semana passada,  anunciei
um colapso por agentes especiais do FAA e pelo inspetor
geral do  DOT, focalizando lapsos no sistema de segurança
operado,  comuns, atualmente, nas linhas aéreas. Desde,
então,  temos interrompido  vôos, fechado, inspecionado,
procurado e reaberto  nove aeroportos principais,  esvaziado
aviões para inspeção de todos os passageiros,  quando
achá-vamos  que os protocolos de  segurança das linhas aé-
reas não tinham seguido procedimentos apropriados.” (Secre-
tário do  Transporte dos Estados Unidos, Norman Mineta,
5 de  novembro, 2001.)
Palavras-chave: vôos atrasados; segurança relacionada a
aeroportos; recuperação das programações de vôo.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Airport security has attracted considerable attention since the
September 11th terrorist attacks. The Aviation and Security Transpor-
tation Act, passed by Congress on November 19, 2001, shifts the
burden of airline passenger security screening from private compa-
nies to the newly created Transportation Security Agency. Audits of
airport security by the Office of Inspector General have revealed
numerous shortcomings in security which have resulted in frequent
airport and terminal closures. During the six months after September
11th, 156 U.S. airport terminal/concourse evacuations occurred lead-
ing to 2,395 flight delays or cancellations (Power, 2002). A study of
airline behavior following airport closures is interesting for two rea-
sons. First, repeated closures due to security concerns and subsequent
reopenings provide the basis for a natural experiment of how airlines
recover flight schedules. Second, these high cost and high profile
events are interesting from a public policy perspective to determine
how the aviation system recovers from a disruption in service. This
work is the first to examine service quality during irregular opera-
tions. This study focuses on security-related airport shutdowns since
these events, unlike weatherrelated closures, cannot be anticipated.
Improved weather forecasting has enabled airlines to adjust flight
schedules due to pending bad weather. Moreover, airports commonly
operate at reduced capacity levels upon reopening due to the inclem-
ent weather; whereas, once the security issue has been resolved, air-
ports can reopen without further constraints. Since the airline indus-
try is highly capital-intensive, carriers seek to minimize time spent on
the ground. For instance, the typical turnaround time for a Southwest
Airlines plane is just 20 minutes (Flint, 2000). A single cancellation or
an extended delay can cause ripple effects throughout the day. Air-
port closures are costly for airlines because they experience a loss in
both revenue and consumer goodwill.1 When closures occur, flight
operations personnel must make real-time cancellation and delay
decisions that will return the airline to the original schedule as
quickly as possible after reopening.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how carriers make
flight operations decisions following security-related airport and
terminal closures. We compare service quality on days of airport
1 The loss in goodwill may be minimial if the consumers blame the Transportation Security
Agency, rather than the airline, for the security-related airport closure.
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closures with previous airline on-time performance research during
normal operating conditions. The remainder of the paper is organ-
ized as follows: related literature and the basic model are presented
next, followed a discussion of these data; results and comparisons
appear in sections III and IV, respectively. We conclude the paper
with some remarks on what role (if any) exists for government
regulation of airline behavior following airport closures.
1.1 Related literature
Mayer and Sinai (2002) examine flight delays (where delay is
defined as flight time in excess of the minimum feasible time on a
route) for all domestic flights by major US carriers between 1988 to
2000. They find longer flight delays occur for hub carriers compared
to non-hub carriers operating from the same airport. This result is
attributed to the clustering of flights around peak travel times by hub
airlines in an effort to minimize passenger wait times between flights.
Mayer and Sinai also report a reduction in excess travel times
from more concentrated airports, however, the hub effect dominates
the airport concentration effect. Brueckner (2003) presents a theoreti-
cal model, supported by some empirical evidence, that shows that
airports with one dominant carrier have fewer delays because a
monopolist will fully internalize the cost of airport congestion.
Mazzeo (2002) finds monopolistic routes have more frequent and
longer flight delays (where delay is defined as the diference be-
tween scheduled and actual arrival time). Rupp andHolmes (2002)
flight cancellation study shows lower cancellation rates for flights
from a carrier’s hub and on routes with infrequent daily service.
Other important cancellation factors include the presence of a low-
fare carrier, route competition, slot-controlled airports, and flight
distance. Morrison and Winston (1989) find higher consumer de-
mand for airlines with large operations from an origination city; as
a result, all estimations include measures for hub operations and
airport concentration. One novelty of this paper, is that we examine
the link between service  quality and potential revenue per flight
(i.e., multiplying average round-trip airfare by seating capacity of
the plane).2 Service quality remains an important issue for airlines
2 The importance of high revenue routes is illustrated by American Airlines, which
operated 14 different typesof jets, each pegged for a specific mission to maximize
revenue” (McCartney, 2002a).
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since passengers who experience flight delays are more likely to
switch carriers (Suzuki, 2000).
1.2 Econometric model
Consider the profit maximization problem facing the airline
agent managing traffic. She has three possible outcomes from which
to assign a particular flight. She can cancel the flight, delay the
flight, or have the flight leave on-time.3 The choice of three discrete
outcomes suggests a discrete choice model. Suppose that the net
future discounted profit, incorporating both short run effects (such
as rebooking costs) as well as long run effects (such as service qual-
ity reputation)4, from flight  having outcome j can be represented as
(1)                    πi(j) = πj(Xi) + εij
where πj(Xi)is a deterministic function of net future discounted
profits of a vector of observable characteristics Xi of flight i (e.g.,
distance) for outcome j. Assuming that  πj(Xi) can be approximated
by a linear function of Xi, the net profit function becomes
(2)                    πi(j) =  Xiβj +εij
where åij is an unobserved (to the econometrician) component influ-
encing the net future discounted profit. For example, the net future
discounted profit if flight i is canceled is
(3)                    πi( CANCEL) XiβCANCEL +εiCANCEL
Assume that “are distributed extreme value. If the εij are assumed
independent and identically distributed, then we have the conven-
tional multinomial logit model (Domencich and Mc- Fadden, 1975?):
(4)                  Pr(i chooses outcome j) =   _eXiβj__________
                                                       Σ k=1....3   eXiβj
3 There is substantial evidence suggesting that airlines do not view a canceled flight as
infinitely delayed. See, for example, Rupp and Holmes (2002).
4 Although passengers may hold harmless the airline for the occurrence of the security
event, once flights begin departing, passengers may lay some blame on the airline if their
flight fails to depart immediately.
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                                    _
where identification requires βk = 0 for one of the three choices. One
well-known consequence  of the conventional multinomial logit
model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (“IIA”): the ratio
of any two probabilities is independent of the options available. For
example, if a particular flight’s probability of each outcome is 1/3,
the elimination of one option (say on-time) implies that the flight
now has a 1/2 probability of cancel and a 1/2 probability of being
delayed so that the ratio of the probabilities remains one. Such a re-
striction seems unreasonably restrictive in this context. While many
options are available for estimating a discrete choice model that re-
laxes the IIA assumption, perhaps the most common is a nested logit
model.5 As one example of a model that might be formulated in our
context, consider the left panel of Figure 1. The agent faces two de-
cisions. First, whether to cancel the flight. Second, for those flights
not canceled, whether the flight should be delayed or depart on-time.
In this case, the inclusive value is the natural log of the sum of the
net profits for not canceling. Define inclusive value
(5)                    Ii = ln        Σ              eXiΒk
                                 k=ONTIME;DELAY
if, for example, outcomes ONTIME and DELAY are grouped into a
“twig”, then calculating the probability of choosing outcome j be-
comes a three step calculation.6
1. Conditional on not canceling, is the flight delayed or on-time?
(6)          Pri( ONTIME / CANCEL) = eXiΒONTIME
                                               1 +e XiβONTIME
where the first term in the denominator is simplified by the nor-
malization that βDELAYED equals 0, like a standard binary logit model.
5 Note that the nested logit model does not require a sequential decision process. An
econometrically equivalent interpretation is that there is one decision but the errors are
heteroskedastic.
6 For more details on these calculations, see Greene (2000).
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2. Calculate the inclusive value
(7)                               Ii = ln (1+  eXiβONTIME )
3. Calculate the cancel-no cancel decision
(8)                                Pri( CANCEL ) = eXiβCANCEL +rli
                                                                  1+eXiβCANCEL +rli
(9)
The unconditional (on CANCEL) probabilities of ONTIME and
DELAY are straight-forward to calculate. Because the estimated
parameters ( β and τ) are difficultto interpret readily, we calculate
and report estimated marginal effects
1.3 Model specification
The model specification – the selection of which outcomes
comes “first” in the carrier’s decision process – was driven prima-
rily by theory. Given the patterns in Figure 2 and the fact that
nearly one-half of all scheduled departures during the shutdown are
canceled, it appears that carriers are attempting to limit the number
of flights to a more manageable (and smaller) set of flights to re-
schedule. Thus, we model the airline operations decision process
during this shutdown period as the carriers first deciding which
flights to cancel, then secondly for the non-canceled flights, the
carrier decides whether the flight departs “on-time” or is “delayed”
(Decision Process 1, Figure 1). After the airport reopening, airline
performance improves immediately and approaches normal opera-
tions as the day progresses. The better performance in the reopen-
ing period suggests that carriers are reverting to the “usual” deci-
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sion processes { first deciding whether the flight departs on-time
and second, if an on-time departure is not possible, whether to
delay or cancel the flight (Decision Process 2, Figure 1). These two
decision processes seem reasonable given the vast performance
differences between the two time periods. During the airport clo-
sure, carriers have sometimes hundreds of flights waiting to be
dispatched. After an airport reopening, the carrier’s operations are
more similar to normal patterns for scheduled departures. Empiri-
cally, there is no criterion on which to choose between the two non-
nested models.7 We present the log-likelihoods for the
multinomimal logit (which imposes IIA) and the alternative theo-
retically-sensible model in each table. We exclude the “delay
first”model specification because it is not sensible. In Models (1)
and (2), the alternative model (on-time first) does not reject the
multinomial logit but our preferred model (cancel first) does. In
Model (3) and (4), the evidence is not as clear cut. In fact, Model (4)
has a slightly higher log-likelihood for the alternative model (cancel
first). In any event, choosing models based on log-likelihood is simi-
lar to choosing based on R-squared. We stress that theory suggested
a specification, and that’s how we selected the specification. The
empirical results “suggested” that our specified models are appro-
priate, but we do not rely on these results. The alternative models
had comparable model estimates.
2 THE DATA
2.1 The sample
The sample includes seventeen cases of security-related airport
and terminal closures during the twelve months after September 11,
2001 (see Table I). Security breaches trigger most air-  7Unlike more
conventional regressions, which could utilize a J-test, for example.
port/terminal closings. These breaches range in severity from sleep-
ing security screeners and unplugged metal detectors to a grenade
(military replica) found in carry-on luggage and passengers running
past security checkpoints. An FBI interrogation of three suspected
terrorists closed Chicago’s Midway airport for 3.5 hours on Septem-
ber 14, 2001. Three New York airports closed November 12, 2001, as
7 Unlike more conventional regressions, which could utilize a J-test, for example.
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a precautionary measure after an American Airlines Airbus A300
jet crashed in Queens, NY shortly after takeoff.
We use the ProQuest General Reference newspaper database8
to search for airport closures, specifying various keyword combina-
tions of airport (or terminal) and closure (or closed or shutdown or
security breach). The sample includes situations in which the entire
airport closed (eleven times) or a terminal/concourse closure (six
times) which affected 100 percent of a carrier’sfeet. We exclude
instances like the evacuation of Concourse B (used by Southwest
Airlines) at the Baltimore-Washington International Airport on
November 3, 2001, due to a woman’s skipping security screening
since Southwest Airlines continued flight operations from Con-
course C. The paper uses four data sources: individual flight data
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS);9 distance and
average round-trip fare from the Department of Transportation
(DOT); and the FAA Aircraft Registry database. All carriers with at
least one percent of domestic scheduled passenger revenues are
required to report on-time performance information for individual
flights. These BTS data cover all nonstop scheduled-service domes-
tic flights by the ten largest or “major” U.S. carriers,10 which account
for more than 90 percent of domestic revenues in 2001. These ten
major carriers are required to report flight operations in 32 U.S.
Airports. Since 1995, every major airline has voluntarily reported all
domestic operations to the BTS.11 The sample includes every sched-
uled departure by major carriers after the airport (or terminal) clo-
sure occurs (n=2,141). The average airport closure in the sample
lasts more than three hours. Approximately one-fourth of the sam-
ple involves flights scheduled while the airportis closed (of course,
the remaining observations are flights scheduled after the airport
reopens). As expected, service quality suffers on days of airport
closures as flight cancellations are six times more likely (22.6 per-
cent are canceled versus the 2001 national average of 3.9 percent);
flightsare twice as likely to be delayed and on-time departures oc-
8 The newspapers include the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and USA Today.
9 http://www.bts.gov/oai/
10 The major carriers include: Alaska, America West, American, Continental, Delta,
Northwest, Southwest, United, and US Airways. TWA is also included prior to December
31, 2001.
11 Prior to 1995, airlines did not report flight delays or cancellations caused by mechanical
difficulties.
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cur for just one-fourth of the sample. Conditional on the flight
not being canceled, flights depart more than one hour (71 min-
utes) after the scheduled departure time following a security-re-
lated airport (or terminal) closure.
2.2 Variables
The following variables are obtained or constructed from BTS
data: ² Cancellation equals one if the scheduled flight is canceled,
otherwise zero. ² Departure delay is the differencebetween actual
and scheduled departure time minus the delay during airport clo-
sure. ² Delay equals one if departure delay exceeds fifteen minutes,
otherwise zero.
• On-time equals one if departure delay is less than fifteen
minutes, otherwise zero.12
• Origination hub equals one if the flight originated from a
carrier’s hub.
•  Destination hub equals one for flights destined for a carrier’s hub.
• Origination slot equals one if flight originates from a slot-
controlled airport (i.e., New YorkLaGuardia, New York JFK, Chi-
cago O’Hara, and Washington National).13
• Destination slot equals one for flights destined for a slot-con-
trolled airport.
• Hours until next flight is the lag time between scheduled
departures on route r for carrier j. Last flight of day is the last
scheduled departure on route r for carrier j.
• Hours after scheduled departure before reopening is the
differencebetween the scheduleddeparture time and when an air-
port reopens.
• Number of flights shutdown for carrier are the total number
of scheduled departures during the airport shutdown for carrier j.
• Airport concentration (or Herfindahl index) is the sum of
the squared market shares at thedeparture airport the day of the
airport closure.
12 Flights scheduled to depart while an airport is closed can still receive an “on-time”
designation if they depart within fifteen minutes of the airport’s reopening.
13 The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century signed by
President Clinton began phasing-out flight restrictions at LaGuardia, JFK, and O’Hare, and
allows for increased operations atNational beginning April 14, 2000. All slot restrictions
were eliminated at O’Hare on July 1, 2002, and are to be eliminatedat LaGuardia and JFK
on January 1, 2007 (www.dot.gov/affairs/2000/dot7900.htm accessed May 14, 2002).
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• Airport market share of largest carrier is the share of sched-
uled departure flights by the largest carrier the day of the airport
closure.
•  Effective competitors is the inverse of the sum of the squared
market shares on a route the day of the airport closure.14
• We match airplane tail numbers to the FAA Aircraft Registry
database to obtain seats:
• Seats in aircraft is the seating capacity of the airplane.
• Hours to clear queue is the number of consecutive hours after
reopening that an origination
• Airport operates at or above capacity before clearing the
backlog of scheduled departures (from the FAA Airport Capacity
Benchmark Report 2001).15
These variables are obtained from the DOT’s Origination and
Destination Survey:16
²Distance is the number of flight miles between origination and
destination airport.
² Potential revenue per flight equals seats in aircraft multiplied
by average round-trip airfare17 (from the Origination and Destination
Survey) for carrier j on route r in 2001.Summary statistics for all
variables in the sample appear on Table II. Distance for these do-
mestic flights varies from 72 miles (Denver to Colorado Springs) to
4,962 miles (Newark to Honolulu) with the average distance of 889
miles between airport pairs. Upon reopening, airports average nearly
3.5 hours of capacity operations before clearing the queue of sched-
uled departures. Aircraft had an average seating capacity of 178
with an average round-trip ticket price of $196. Hence, the average
potential revenue per flight (seats*ticket price) is $34,871. Since
Borenstein and Netz (2001) and Mayer and Sinai (2002) show that
hub carriers cluster scheduled departures, we construct hours until
14 See Morrison and Winston (1995) for a discussion of effective competition in the airline
industry.
15 Two airports in the sample (Chicago Midway and Louisville) are not included in the
FAA’s Airport Capacity Benchmark Report 2001 (since they are not among the 31 busiest
airports in the U.S.). Hence zero hours of capacity operations are recorded for departures
from these two airports.
16 http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/aviation/aptcomp/aptcomp2001.htm.
17 Qualitatively identical results are obtained for average one-way airfare (dividing round-
trip airfare by 2). Weuse round-trip rather than one-way airfare since most passengers
purchase round-trip tickets.
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next flight to measure the frequency of flights on a route. The av-
erage lag time between flights is 2.6 hours.18 Two-thirds of the
scheduled flights originate from a carrier’s hub airport and one-
third have hub destinations. Slot-controlled originations and desti-
nations comprise 12 and 10 percent, respectively of the sample. we
find that routes have an average of 1.5 effective competitors (or the
inverse of the route’sHerfindahl index). The average departure air-
port concentration is 0.51 with Denver International being closest
to the average having a 0.55 airport concentration rate.
3 RESULTS
3.1 How do airlines recover flight schedules?
Airport closures involve two separate events. The first event is
an unexpected security breach which closes the airport. The second
event, anticipated by the airlines, is the airport reopening. Figure 2
plots the cancellation, delay, and on-time data for scheduled depar-
tures before, during, and after the shutdown. Because airport clo-
sures and reopenings occur at various times and durations through-
out the day, the data cannot be meaningfully grouped by time of
day. Instead, we standardize the data by normalizing each period
into one unit. That is, the normalized data consist of three equal
\length” periods of time for each event, even though each event
lasts a different number of hours. Finally, we combine the data
across events and calculate mean outcomes for each quintile of time
within the period. For example, Chicago Midway closed from ap-
proximately 1:20 p.m. until 4:50 p.m., while Denver International
closed from approximately 7:15 a.m. until 8:55 a.m. The first
quintile of flights scheduled during the Midway closure are sched-
uled departures between 1:20 p.m. and 2:02 p.m. (42minutes is one
fifthof the total shutdown time of 3.5 hours). Denver’s first quintile
during the closure involves flights scheduled to depart from 7:15
a.m. until 7:35 a.m; in this case, just twenty minutes constitutes
one-fifthof the airport closure time. The graph is therefore divided
into three segments. The leftmost segment consists of the flights
scheduled before the security event occurred. The left vertical line
18 Similar results are also obtained for the number of daily scheduled flights remaining for
carrier j on route rafter an airport shutdown (instead of hours until next flight) and are
available upon request of the authors.
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represents the (normalized) time that the airport closes, while the
right vertical line is the reopening time. The middle segment, there-
fore, represents the period of airport closure. Finally, the rightmost
segment consists of flights scheduled after the airport reopening.
Even with the normalization process, which should introduce con-
siderable noise to theaverage outcomes, clear patterns emerge in
service quality before, during, and after the airport closure. The on-
time rate for the pre-shutdown flights is eighty-one percent, which
slightly exceeds the national average for domestic flights by major
carriers in 2001 of seventy-three percent. These better than usual
service quality data suggest that airports had normal operations
before the security breach occurred. The middle segment in Figure
2 reveals that at the onset of the airport closure, possibly due to
uncertainty as to how long the closure will last, there is a large jump
in the proportion of flight cancellations. The cancellation rates av-
erage forty-two percent during closure or more than ten times the
2001 national average (3.9 percent). As the airport reopening ap-
proaches, the cancellation rate begins to fall { indicating that some
of the earlier uncertainty about the reopening time has been re-
solved. Lower cancellation rates prior to reopening, however, come
at a cost to carriers in the form of higher proportion of flight delays.
Flights originally scheduled to depart during the airport closure
period also have lower on-time and higher delay rates.19After the
airport reopening, airline performance improves significantly as the
cancellation rate drops immediately, the on-time departure rate
climbs throughout the remainder of the day, and the delay rate
which peaks immediately after the reopening, monotonically falls
shortly thereafter. Given that Figure 2 suggests that outcome pat-
terns for these periods are vastly different, we separately analyze
flights scheduled to depart during and after the airport shutdown.20
Flights scheduled to depart during the airport closure (n=609)
have the worst service quality.21 Carriers appear to make cancella-
tion decisions without regard to many competitive, logistical, or
revenue factors. Model (1) in Table III reveals that only three
19 Recall that ONTIME is defined “flight departs within fifteen minutes of first available
opportunity after scheduled departure time”, so a flight scheduled to depart during
the shutdown is considered “on-time” if it departs within fifteen minutes of the
airport’s reopening.
20 In early models we formally tested whether the two periods could be pooled. Tests
unequivocally rejected pooling.
21 We drop all flights that depart or are scheduled to depart before the airport closure.
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flight characteristics matter during the closure period: hours after
scheduled departure before reopening (i.e., flights scheduled ear-
lier in the airport closure), distance, and seats in aircraft. Marginal
effects appear in Table III instead of nested logit coeficient esti-
mates since the marginal effects incorporate information from all
decision nodes.22 Moreover, due to the nested specification, the
coeficient estimates may not even have the same sign or signifi-
cance as the marginal effects. The marginal effects in Model (1) are
interpreted as follows: an additional hour of airport closure after
a scheduled departure increases the cancellation rate by 7.0 per-
centage points, while decreasing the proportion of delayed flights
by nearly 7.8 percentage points. These results are also economically
significant given that a 7 percent increase in the cancellation rate
is nearly twice the cancellation average (3.9 percent) for major
carriers in 2001. These findings suggest that carriers cancel earlier
flights in the shutdown period and re-book displaced passengers
onto later flights. In addition, by canceling flights scheduled to
depart during the shutdown, carriers also minimize the loss in
goodwill since passengers maybe less likely to blame the carrier for
these cancellations. Cancellations are less frequent and delays are
more prevalent on longer flights (in terms of distance) during an
airport shutdown. specifically, a 500 mile increase in flight dis-
tance would, on average, decrease the cancellation rate by 5.5
percentage points and increase the delay rate by 8.5 percentage
points. After controlling for revenue and seating capacity, we
suggest two potential reasons why carriers may provide better
service on long-distance flights. First, with the exception  of South-
west, airlines operate a variety of aircraft.23 Flight crews may not
be interchangeable between and in some cases within plane
types.24  Since there are many short-haul flights (more than half
the sample involves flights of less than 750 miles) and few long-
haul flights (only 18% of the sample are flights over 1,500 miles),
there are fewer substitutes available for long-haul flights. Carriers
22 Nested logit coeficients and standard errors are available upon request of the authors.
23 Southwest operates one type of plane (Boeing 737). Whereas until recently, American
and Continental operated fourteen and nine different types of jets, respectively
(McCartney, 2002b).
24 For example, according to Continental Airlines personnel a DC9-30 aircraft cannot be
substituted for a MD-80 or a Boeing 737-300, yet a DC9-30 can be substituted for a Boeing
737-200. The Boeing 737-200 cannot substitue for a Boeing 737-300, yet a Boeing 737-300
can substitute for a Boeing 737-200 (Thengvall, Yu, and Bard, 2001).
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may havedifficultly locating replacement crews certified to fly
aircraft serving long-haul routes. Second, in November, 2000 the
FAA ruled (i.e., the \Whitlow letter”)25  that 16 hours is the maxi-
mum time a pilot can remain on duty, regardless of delays caused
by weather, air traffic control, or maintenance.26 Flights may not
leave the gate or take-of, if it is known that the actual expected
flight time will cause a pilot to exceed the 16 hour time limit.
Consequently, carriers have an incentive to get long-haul flights of
the ground before pilots become “illegal”. Planes with more seating
capacity also have higher rates of delay. We attribute longer loading
times of larger planes (which are also more likely to be full given
the higher cancellation rates) to more frequent delays for flights
scheduled to depart during an airport shutdown. The severity of the
airport shutdown triggered by a security breach becomes apparent
after viewing the list of insignificant cancellation and delay vari-
ables: potential revenue per flight, origination & destination hubs,
origination & destination slots, airport concentration, effective com-
petitors, hours to clear queue, hours until next flight, last flight of
day, and number of flights shutdown for carrier.
Model (2) includes airline fixed effects. Overall, similar results
are found for the fixed effects estimates. Flights scheduled at the
beginning of the airport shutdown again have higher cancellation and
lower delay rates. specifically, airport closures that last an additional
hour after a flights’ scheduled departure have 5.9 percent higher
cancellation rates and 5.7 percent lower delay rates. In addition, the
distance effect is more prevalent in the fixed effects specification as
a 500 mile increase in flight length causes 8.5 and 9.5 percentage
point increases in cancellation and delay rates, respectively.
A few differences appear in the airline fixed effects estimates.
After controlling for airline effects, we find that larger aircraft are no
longer subject to more frequent delays. In addition, two competitive
measures obtain statistical significance. Routes with more effective
competitors have higher cancellation rates and lower delay rates.
There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, similar findings
25 We thank Miles Maier for bringing the Whitlow letter to our attention.
26 On June 7, 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, issued a
unanimous decision,agreeing with the FAA interpretation of FAR 121.471b, clarifying
that 16 hours is the maximum time a pilot may remain on duty, regardless of reason for
delay (www.alpa.org).
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have been documented in the literature.27 Second, more competitive
routes may have excess capacity,28 enabling carriers to consolidate
these flights more effectively - given two flights on the route, the
carrier may cancel one and move the passengers to a later flight.
Flights destined for a carrier’s hub are less likely to be canceled
and more likely to be delayed. The magnitude of the hub destination
effect is large: 17.6 percentage points lower cancellation rates and
18.6 percentage points higher delay rates. Carriers may provide
better service for flights going to hubs for the benefit of passengers
and flight crews. Since a majority of passengers make connections
at a typical hub (Morrison and Winston, 1995), canceling hub des-
tination flights are more inconvenient for connecting passengers
and potentially more costly for airlines since tickets must be reis-
sued for each missed connection. Canceling a hub destination
flight also marginally increases the probability that connecting pas-
sengers arrive a day late to their destinations{a major passenger in-
convenience. In addition, after an airport closure (which lasts on av-
erage more than three hours) and subsequent flight delay (more
than an hour on average), flight crews may be approaching the 16
hour duty-time limits. Since replacement flight crews are more ac-
cessible at hubs, carriers have an incentive not to cancel hub des-
tination flights. Next, we examine the flights scheduled to depart
after an airport reopens (n=1,532). Figure 2 shows that airport op-
erations improve substantially after the reopening. Many more
variables are significant during this period. Model 3 on Table 2
indicates that higher potential revenue flights receive significantly
better service quality. For example, flights with $10,000 higher
potential revenue have 7 percentage points lower delay rates and 7
percentage points higher ontime rates. Carriers can avoid costly
passenger reimbursements by providing better service on higher
revenue routes.29  Fewer delays on higher revenue routes is also con-
27 Rupp and Holmes (2002) find that routes with more effective competitors have higher
cancelation rates. Rupp, Owens, and Plumly (2002) report more frequent delays occur on
routes with more effective competitors. Mazzeo (2002), however, finds monopolist routes
have higher delay rates.
28 For example, a common response by major carriers to new-entrant carriers includes fare
reductions and capacity increases (Morrison and Winston, 2000).
29 Refunds should be provided upon request to passengers who wish to cancel their trip as
a result of a flight  cancellation or significant schedule change made by the carrier”
(Norman Strickland, Assistant Director for office of Aviation Enforcement and
Proceedings, September 25, 2001, airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/rules/20010925.htm).
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sistent with Suzuki (2000), who reports that passengers are more
likely to switch carriers after experiencing flight delays.
Logistical variables are also important in airline schedule recov-
ery efforts. Flights with longer gaps between airport reopening and
scheduled departure are more likely to depart on-time, less likely to
be delayed, and have slightly higher cancellation rates. Airport capac-
ity constraints are also important since airports that need more hours
to clear the queue of scheduled flights during the closure have more
cancellations, more delays and fewer on-time arrivals. Specifically,
airports that require an additional hour to clear the backlog of sched-
uled departures experience 3.5 and 4.5 percentage points higher can-
cellation and delay rates, respectively and 8.0 percentage point reduc-
tion in on-time averages. By the end of the day, normal operations
have returned at most airports that experience security breaches since
last flight of day has lower delay rates (8.7 percentage points) and
higher on-time rates (8.3 percentage points). Moreover, an additional
benefit of getting the last flight of day on-time to its scheduled des-
tination is that carriers set themselves up for normal operations the
following day. Carriers with higher traffic volumes (i.e., scheduled
departures during an airport closure) provide worse service quality
after an airport reopens. For example, cancellation rates are 2 percent-
age points higher for carriers with ten additional scheduled depar-
tures during the shutdown. Longer flights again have significantly
higher delay rates and are now less likely to depart on-time. specifi-
cally, flights that are 500 miles longer have 6 percentage points higher
rates of departure delay and 7 percentage points lower on-time rates.
Mazzeo (2002) reports better on-time arrival rates for longer flights,
which suggests that pilots can make-up time while airborne. Hence,
departure delays for long-haul flights can be partially ofset by pilots
“speeding” while in the air. Finally, flights scheduled to depart after
an airport reopens avoid the lengthy airport shutdown period and
subsequent delays, and consequently, the 16 hour duty-time limit for
pilots is no longer a binding constraint. This may explain why long-
haul flights no longer have significantly lower cancellations rates. we
find that delays are more prevalent and on-time departures less fre-
quent for aircraft with more seats. This maybe a consequence of
longer loading times for larger planes. Some logistical issues are air-
port, rather than airplane, specific. For example, flights from an
origination slot are more likely to be cancelled and depart on-time.
This apparent contradiction is due to the nature of slots, since slot
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holders have a limited time (typically one hour)30 to “use it” or “lose
it”. Hence, flights that cannot depart in a given window are
canceled.
After controlling for the number of carrier flights scheduled
during the shutdown, flights scheduled to depart after an airport
reopening from highly concentrated airports still experience more
cancellations and fewer on-time departures. For example, the mar-
ginal effects suggest that increasing the airport concentration rate by
a tenth of a point (i.e., approximately the differences between
Denver International 0.55 and Chicago Midway 0.66) leads to a 7
percentage points increase in the cancellation rate and a 8 percent-
age points reduction in the on-time departure rate. When the bulk
of the flights scheduled from an airport must be rescheduled by one
carrier, service quality suffers. This result illustrates the complexity
of coordinating aircraft routing, scheduling flight crews, assigning
gates, and passenger recovery following an airport shutdown. Few
notable changes occur for airline fixed effects estimates (Model 4)
for flights scheduled after an airport reopens. Generally, the
magnitudes of the estimated coeficients decrease slightly with the
inclusion of airline fixed effects. Once again, flights with more po-
tential revenue have significantly better service quality. Flights with
longer gaps between airport reopening and scheduled departure are
more likely to depart on-time. Similarly, the last flight of day on a
route  has significantly higher on-time rates. Volume effects are also
important as carriers with more scheduled departures during the
shutdown have higher cancellation rates. Long distance flights and
aircraft with larger seating capacities are significantly more likely to
be delayed and less likely to be on-time. We find two differences in
the fixed effects estimates for logistical variables. First, routes with
more hours until next flight (i.e., infrequent service) have signifi-
cantly higher delay rates. Second, the inclusion of airline fixed ef-
fects eliminates the slot-origination effects. Fixed effects also cause
two changes in the competition variables: hub destination flights are
now significantly associated with lower on-time departure rates and
airline fixed effects eliminate airport concentration effects.
30 Slots last for 30 minutes at JFK in the summer and 60 minutes in the winter. Chicago
O’Hare slots are 30 minutes year-round (author interview with Brian Meehan of the FAA).
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3.2 How do schedule recovery results compare with previous
findings?
This section compares schedule recovery results with existing
airline on-time performance literature. Comparisons across airline
studies are di±cult, given the differences in methodology, routes,
time periods, and data. Yet prior studies provide valuable bench-
marks for comparisons to determine how flight operation deci-
sions during airport closures differ from typical days. We are
aware of only a handful of airline on-time performance studies:
one for flight cancellations (Rupp and Holmes, 2002) and four
involving flight delays31 (Brueckner, 2003; Mazzeo, 2002; Mayer
and Sinai, 2002; Rupp, Owens, and Plumly, 2002). Many of our
schedule recovery results are consistent with this previous work,
some are not, and a few opposite findings appear. We begin by
comparing flight cancellations on days of airport closures with a
flight cancellation study by Rupp and Holmes (hereafter RH). The
most notable service quality differences occurs at hubs. Using a
four year sample period, RH report significantly lower cancellation
rates for hub carriers at both originations and destinations.
Whereas, on days of airport closures due to security breaches, we
find that flights originating from a carrier’s hub have little bearing
on flight cancellations. we find one result consistent with RH for
hub destinations, since flights scheduled to depart during an air-
port shutdown and destined for a carrier’s hub, have significantly
lower cancellation rates (Model 2). We are unable to confirm a RH
result that routes with more frequent scheduled service (i.e., fewer
hours until next flight) have higher cancellation rates. We discover
a significant change in airline behavior for long-haul flights during
airport closures. Long distance flights in the RH sample have
higher cancellation rates, yet carriers are less likely to cancel long
distance flights scheduled during the airport shutdown. Next, for
the consistent results. RH report higher cancellation rates on
routes with more effective competitors, a result that also appears
for fixed effects estimates of flights scheduled during the airport
shutdown. Consistent with RH, we also find higher cancellation
rates for slot-controlled originations after an airport reopens. We
do not, however, detect significantly higher cancellation rates for
31 Foreman and Shea (1999) also estimate flight delays, yet their usage of carrier-level
aggregated data makes for difficultcomparisons.
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flights to slot-controlled destinations. Next, we compare flight
delays following airport closures with previous delay studies.
More frequent hub origination delays (Brueckner, 2003; Rupp,
Owens, and Plumly, 2002) and longer hub delays (Mayer and Si-
nai, 2002) have been noted in the airline literature. After airport
shutdowns, however, we do not find flight delays to be more
prevalent for flights originating from a carrier’s hub. Consistent
with Mayer and Siani (2002), we find hub destination flights have
higher delay rates if scheduled during the shutdown (Model 2)
and significantly fewer on-time departures after an airport reopens
(Model 4).32  We note, however, that hub destination flights are
also less likely to be canceled (Model 2). Rupp, Owens, and
Plumly (2002) show that airports which operate at capacity for
longer periods have both more frequent and longer delays. Simi-
larly, we find that airports which need more hours to clear the
queue of scheduled departures after reopening, have a larger pro-
portion of delayed flights.
One significant differencein airline service quality occurs at
highly concentrated airports. More concentrated airports have better
historical on-time performance (Mayer and Sinai, 2002; Brueckner,
2003), yet following security-related airport closures, we find that
more concentrated airports fare worse: significantly more flight can-
cellations and fewer on-time departures (Model 3) and marginally33
fewer on-time departures in Model (4). To further explore the ro-
bustness of these airport concentration findings, we use an alterna-
tive measure of airport concentration{ airport market share of the
largest carrier. we find similar results as airports in which the larg-
est carrier is more dominant also experience more cancellations and
fewer on-time departures (i.e., for flights scheduled to depart after
an airport reopens).34 These results once again illustrate how
difficultit is to recover from a major service disruption. Reschedul-
ing problems are compounded as more flights are effected. Finally,
we are now able to comment on the performance of a network-type
models linear programming solution for aircraft schedule recovery
following irregular operations. The proposed solution to irregular
32 Mayer and Sinai (2002) report that hub origination has a larger effect on delays than hub
destination, a result not found in this airport closure study.
33 Marginally significant refers to a 10% significance level.
34 These results are available upon request of the authors.
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operations by Thengvall, Bard, and Yu (2000) includes more can-
cellations on low revenue flights. Using actual airport closure data,
we find that flights with higher potential revenue are less likely to
be delayed and more likely to be on-time after an airport reopens.
We do not, however, find any linkage between revenue and can-
cellation rates.
4 CONCLUSION
The Aviation and Security Transportation Act reassigned the
responsibility of airport safety from private security companies to
federal control. Federalizing the security screening process may
improve air safety, yet Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta’s
“ zero-tolerance” policy towards airport security lapses indicates
that future security-related airport closures are likely to occur. Air
travelers are paying for aviation security improvements both di-
rectly, via the September 11th security fee ($2.50 for each air carrier
passenger enplanement),35  and indirectly by longer security screen-
ing waiting times and frequent security-related airport/terminal
shutdowns. Both airports and the Transportation Security Agency
are taking steps to prevent future security breaches from closing
entire airports. Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) has created
many separate and smaller security zones within its airport by clos-
ing some connecting tunnels between terminals.36 These tunnels had
enabled passengers to catch connecting flights without being re-
screened. In addition, a Transportation Security Agency memo
dated May 23, 2002, now requires airport security managers obtain
permission from supervisors before evacuating concourses follow-
ing a security breach (Morrison, 2002). Since September 11th, fre-
quent security breaches have closed U.S. airports, providing the
basis for a natural experiment on how airlines recover flight sched-
ules following a major service disruption. These airport closure data
reveal substantially different patterns in service quality for flights
scheduled during and after airport shutdowns. Carriers cancel
nearly half of all scheduled flights during an airport shutdown.
35 The September 11 Security Fee was authorized by the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act signed by President George Bush on November 19, 2001. Air carriers began
collecting the fee on February 1, 2002 (www.dot.gov/a®airs/dot13001.htm accessed June
26, 2002).
36 For more details on the tunnel closures at LAX see the February 28, 2002, Los Angeles
World Airports news release (www.lawa.org).
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Consequently, only three flight characteristics matter during the
closure period. The relevant variables are flights scheduled earlier
in the airport closure (more cancels and fewer delays), flight dis-
tance (fewer cancels and more delays for longer flights), and aircraft
seating capacity (more delays for larger planes). After an airport
reopens, service quality improves significantly as the cancellation
rate drops immediately and the on-time performance rate climbs
steadily throughout the day. The set of significant explanatory vari-
ables expands considerably after an airport reopens. Carriers pro-
vide better service for higher potential revenue flights. A higher
proportion of flights scheduled to depart after an airport reopening
are canceled from slot origination airports, highly concentrated air-
ports, airports that need more hours to clear the queue of scheduled
departures, and carriers with more flights scheduled during the
shutdown. we find fewer departure delays for flights scheduled
many hours after the airport reopening, flights that originate from
slot-controlled airports, and last flight of day.
Airlines confront complex airline flight crew scheduling and
passenger re-booking issues after airport closures. Consequently, we
find some significantly different changes in service quality on days
of airport closures compared to historical performance. For exam-
ple, unlike typical travel days, the cancellation rate for hub origina-
tion flights is not significantly lower, nor are flight delays more
prevalent. Long distance flights have higher historical cancellation
rates, yet long-haul flights scheduled to depart during an airport
closure are less likely to be canceled. After airport closures, carriers
have an incentive to get long-haul flights of the ground before pi-
lots violate duty-time limits. Carriers minimize passenger inconven-
ience by quickly restoring flight schedules after an airport reopens.
This helps to ensure that connecting passengers, which are sched-
uled to depart after an airport reopens, make their connecting
flights. Passengers which have already missed connections due to
the airport shutdown, can also be re-booked onto later flights. Air-
port capacity constraints also in°uence flight schedule recovery ef-
forts. Airports which  operate for longer periods at capacity (i.e.,
need more hours to clear the scheduled flight queue) upon reopen-
ing experience more frequent cancellations and delays. Carriers
with a dominant airport market share also have an especially
difficulttime recovering flight schedules following airport closures.
This analysis shows little need for public policy which regulates
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airline schedule recovery efforts since carriers are currently making
flight operation decisions that maximize profits (i.e., better service
on higher potential revenue flights) and minimize passenger incon-
venience (i.e., fewer cancellations on long-haul flights and quickly
restoring flight schedules after airport reopens) given existing air-
port capacity constraints.
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Table I: U.S. Airport and Terminal Closures due to Security Breaches during the twelve
months following September 11th, 2001.
   Percent                     Average
                  Length of                       During Percent Percent Delay3
Date Airport Closure1 Observations Shutdown Delayed2 Canceled (minutes) Shutdown Reason
9/14/2001 Chicago (MDW) 3:29 79 42% 75% 24% 136.9 FBI questions three
 suspected terrorists
11/1/2001 New York (JFK) 0:49 13 23% 69% 8% 73.3 Screeners not
following proper procedure
11/12/2001 New York (JFK) 9:47 66 89% 33% 55% 52.8 AA Fight 587 crashes in
Queens,  NY.
11/12/2001 Nemark (EWR) 5:12 197 41% 45% 39% 67.1 AA Fight 587 crashes in
Queens,  NY.
11/12/2001 New York (LGA) 5:25 176 47% 14% 55% 18.1 AA Fight 587 crashes in
Queens,  NY.
11/16/2001 Atlanta (ATL) 3:43 405 31% 53% 45% 186.0 Passenger runs past security
checkpoint.
11/24/2001 Seattle (SEA) 2:45 165 21% 79% 1% 69.5 Unplugged metal detector.
12/18/2001 Charlotte (CLT) 1:48 233 19% 52% 25% 75.8 Unplugged metal detector.
12/18/2001 Baltimore (BWI) 2:32 22 45% 64% 0% 21.2 Suspicious image on X-ray scanner
2/19/2002 Louisville (SDF) 2:21 45 24% 38% 0% 61.5 Sleeping security screener.
2/24/2002 Salt Lake 3:07 15 100% 73% 7% 61.5 Luggage-screening machine
City (SLC) malfunction
2/28/2002 Los Angeles (LAX) 1:50 151 15% 69% 1% 56.9 Metal detector malfunction.
3/4/2002 Los Angeles (LAX) 3:00 30 13% 43% 7% 39.1 Grenade found in carry-on
luggage.
5/12/2002 Cincinnati (CVG) 2:37 117 9% 35% 2% 18.2 Passenger claims to have
small knife
6/29/2002 Washington (IAD) 2:13 11 82% 73% 0% 40.5 Passenger with a knife clears
security
7/27/2002 Los Angeles (LAX) 2:07 73 36% 73% 4% 80.2 Man bypasses security
checkpoint.
8/26/2002 Denver (DEN) 1:49 343 10% 49% 1% 35.2 Woman bypasses seuciryt
screening.
Total 3:12 2141 28% 51% 22.6% 71.4
1 Length of closure is denoted as hours:minutes.
2 Flight delay and cancellation numbers are only for the ten major domestic carriers (America West, American Airlines, Alaska,
Continenal, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA (before 12/31/2001), United, US Airways).
3 Average departure delay (minutes) is the difference between actual and schewduled departure time minus the unavoidable
length of closure delay. Canceled flights are excluded in this departure delay calculation.
Table II: Summary Statistics for Scheduled Flights During U. S. Airport and Terminal
Closures (n = 2,141)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Percent canceled 0.226 0.418 0 1
Percent delayed 0.513 0.500 0 1
Percent on-time 0.261 0.439 0 1
Potential Revenue per Flight ($ 1,000´s) 34.871 18.891 4.353 138.166
Distance (100´s miles) 8.889 6.341 0.72 49.62
Seats in aircraft (100´s) 1.779 0.573 0.160 4.950
Hours to clear queue 3.461 2.623 0 8.5
Hours after reopening before scheduled departure1 1.966 1.647 0.017 9.733
Hours until next flight 2.629 1.873 0.017 15.333
Last flight of day 0.304 0.460 0 1
Number of Flights Shutdown for Carrier 33.750 34.936 9 106
Origination slot 0.119 0.324 0 1
Destination slot 0.096 0.294 0 1
Origination hub 0.674 0.469 0 1
Destination hub 0.346 0.476 0 1
Airport concentration (at departure) 0.514 0.235 0.213 0.838
Effective competitors (on route) 1.468 0.591 1 4
Departure Delay 2 (minutes) 71.406 83.064 -12 573
Airport market share of largest carrier (percent) 0.668 0.234 0.269 0.914
1 For flights scheduled to departure after airport reopens.
2 Departure delay excludes flight cancellations.
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Table III: Marginal Effects: Flights Schedeuled During Airport Shudtown
Model                                                                                                               (1)                                         (2)
Outcome Cancel Delayed On-time Cancel Delayed On-time
Potential Revenue per Flight (1000´s) 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Logistical Variables
Distance (100‘s Miles) 0.011* 0.017* -0.006 0.017** 0.019** -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Seats in Aircraft 0.102 0.138* -0.036 -0.069 0.085 -0.016
(0.061) (0.057) (0.034) (0.065) (0.061) (0.030)
Hours to Clear Queue 0.048 -0.034 -0.014 0.069 -0.047 -0.022
(0.027) (0.022) (0.015) (0.048) (0.043) (0.013)
Hours After Scheduled Departure 0.070* -0.078** 0.008 0.059** -0.057** -0.003
Before Reopening (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Hours Until Next Flight 0.004 -0.008 0.004 0.005 -0.006 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
Last Flight of Day 0.000 -0.069 0.069 0.046 -0.056 0.009
(0.071) (0.077) (0.039) (0.082) (0.082) (0.028)
Number of Flights 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
Shutdown for Carrier (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Origination Slot 0.354 -0.384 0.031 0.318 -0.340 0.022
(0.373) (0.425) (0.074) (0.230) (0.236) (0.053)
Destanation Slot 0.029 -0.043 0.014 0.022 -0.024 0.002
(4.829) (3.394) (1.474) (3.997) (2.838) (1.203)
Competition Variables
Origination Hub 0.064 0.117 -0.053 0.103 0.133 -0.029
(0.142) (0.142) (0.045) (0.207) (0.190) (0.054)
Destination Hub 0.105 0.132 -0.027 -0.176* 0.186** -0.010
(0.076) (0.071) (0.034) (0.070) (0.068) (0.031)
Airport Concentration 0.322 -0.199 -0.123 0.586 -0.216 -0.371
(0.560) (0.320) (0.324) (0.428) (0.396) (0.201)
Effective Competitors 0.058 -0.052 -0.006 0.082* -0.073* -0.009
(0.038) (0.036) (0.018) (0.038) (0.036) (0.019)
Airline fixed Effects? No Yes
Log-likelihood - 358.40 -318.60
N 609 609
Log-likelihood (ILA) -360.13 -337.67
Log-likelihood (On-time 1th) -360.06 -337.57
Cell entries are estimated marginal effects with bootstrapped standard erros in parentheses.
** Significant at 1%; *: Significant at 5%
Table IV: Marginal Effects: After Airport Reopers
Model                                                                                                               (3)                                         (4)
Outcome Cancel Delayed On-time Cancel Delayed On-time
Potential Revenue per Flight (1000´s) 0.001 -0.007** 0.007** 0.000 -0.003* 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Logistical Variables
Distance (100‘s Miles) 0.001 0.012** -0.014** 0.003 0.018** -0.015**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Seats in Aircraft 0.017 0.155** -0.138** 0.036 0.127** -0.091*
(0.035) (0.043) (0.041) (0.030) (0.037) (0.039)
Hours to Clear Queue 0.035** 0.045* -0.080** 0.018 0.045* -0.063**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.019)
Hours After Reopening 0.013** -0.025** 0.038** 0.014 -0.012 0.026*
Before Scheduled Departure (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Hours Until Next Flight 0.006 -0.005 0.001 0.008 0.024* -0.016
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Last Flight of Day 0.005 -0.087 0.083* 0.022 -0.0556 0.077*
(0.024) (0.036) (0.035) (0.023) (0.041) (0.036)
Number of Flights 0.002** 0.002 -0.003 0.003** 0.003 -0.005
Shutdown for Carrier (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Origination Slot 0.236* -0.821* 0.585* 0.029 -0.276 0.248
(0.115) (0.332) (0.241) (0.094) (0.172) (0.204)
Destanation Slot 0.001 0.033 -0.032 0.029 -0.015 -0.014
(0.022) (0.054) (0.044) (0.023) (0.043) (0.041)
Competition Variables
Origination Hub 0.042 0.032 -0.074 -0.062 0.156 -0.094
(0.057) (0.053) (0.059) (0.103) (0.126) (0.119)
Destination Hub 0.038 -0.026 -0.012 0.002 0.070 -0.072*
(0.026) (0.042) (0.034) (0.028) (0.041) (0.035)
Airport Concentration 0.718* 0.076 -0.794** 0.073 0.224 -0.297
(0.147) (0.180) (0.203) (0.195) (0.224) (0.169)
Effective Competitors 0.002 -0.035 -0.032 0.018 0.038 -0.020
(0.025) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.0249)
Airline fixed Effects? No Yes
Log-likelihood - 1171.47 -1099.03
N 1532 1532
Log-likelihood (ILA) -1179.15 -1100.43
Log-likelihood (On-time 1th) -1175.25 -1098.017
Cell entries are estimated marginal effects with bootstrapped standard erros in parentheses.
** Significant at 1%; *: Significant at 5%
